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Financial Development, Shocks and Growth Volatility  
 
Abstract 
This paper argues that studying the effect of financial development and shocks on 
aggregate growth volatility will not be informative because they affect growth volatility 
through its different components. Volatility declines either a consequence of a change in 
the nature of shocks or a change in how the economy reacts to shocks.  If two economies 
differ only in terms of volatility of shocks experienced, the GDP growth spectrum of one 
economy will lie proportionately below that of another at all frequency ranges so that 
both business cycle and long-run variances will be lower. Conversely, if change in 
volatility is due to propagation mechanism such as financial development, a country 
having developed financial markets will have disproportionately lower variance at the 
business cycle than at other frequencies relative to that of a country having less 
developed financial markets. Therefore, the variance at only the business cycle frequency 
range will be influenced by financial development. The novelty of this paper is that 
different components of growth volatility are extracted using spectral method.  
Empirical evidence provides qualified support for both hypotheses. Higher private 
credit, which is used as proxy of financial development, dampens business cycle 
volatility but not the long-run volatility. Shocks, as measured by changes in the terms of 
trade, affect both business cycle and long-run volatility negatively. These results are 
robust to alternative market-based measure of financial development, and corrections for 
reverse causality. These results have important implications for growth theory as they 
shed lights on the factors causing permanent and transitory deviations from the steady 
state.  
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Financial Development, Shocks and Growth Volatility 
 
I. Introduction 
Growth models focus on the trend growth and a large body of literature has 
studied the role of the financial development in economic growth.
1
 Business cycle 
volatility is related to financial development through several channels including the flow 
of information and the enforcement of contracts. Shocks, on the other hand, generate and 
magnify the business cycle volatility and also affect the long-run trend growth that 
depends on the shock persistence. There are several models that try to bridge growth and 
business cycle models and explain the role of financial development and shocks in 
growth volatility (Aghion et al., 2007, and papers cited therein).  There is also a nascent 
literature that empirically investigates the role of financial development in growth 
volatility but without making any distinction between its long-run and business cycle 
components. These studies use the standard deviation of the growth rate of per capita real 
GDP as the measure of volatility.  
In this paper we argue and show that financial development and shocks affect 
total volatility through its different components. Specifically, we show that financial 
development impacts only on the business cycle component of volatility while shocks 
impact on both the long-run and business cycle components, and therefore on total 
volatility. In other words, volatility caused by shocks is more persistent than that caused 
by financial underdevelopment.
2
 This paper can be considered as an attempt to 
investigate the bridge between the two approaches mentioned above. The novelty of this 
paper is that it employs spectral method to extract business cycle and long-run 
components of the variance of the growth rate of real GDP per capita. This investigation 
has also important implications for growth theory. Previous studies do not distinguish the 
factors that cause permanent and transitory deviations from the steady state growth rate. 
                                                 
1
 Levine (1997) provides an excellent discussion.  
2
 Long-run volatility can be a consequence when serial correlation of output growth rate is very large or an 
economy does not revert to the original steady state after deviation or exhibits limit cycles. In the latter two 
cases growth rate is nonstationary. Long-run volatility estimated in the paper is more consistent with the 
first case. We use long-run volatility and persistent volatility interchangeably. 
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This paper sheds some lights on this issue by investigating two important factors—
financial development and shocks.  
Assuming that the output growth series is covariance stationary, its variance can 
be expressed as the integral of the spectrum of the series across all frequencies, 
     . Therefore, a country with lower growth variance would have a spectrum 
lying below the one for the country with higher growth variance. It does not necessarily 
mean that the spectrum will lay below at all frequency ranges; the area under the 
spectrum will be smaller. Distribution of the two spectra across different frequency 
ranges is very informative in explaining the relative volatility at different frequency 
ranges (Ahmed et al., 2004, p. 825).   
Any stochastic model of the economy can be thought of a combination of some 
shocks and a propagation mechanism. Output growth volatility declines either as a 
consequence of a change in the nature of shocks or as a change in the propagation 
mechanism, i.e., a change in how the economy reacts to shocks, or a combination of both.  
If two economies differ only in terms of volatility of shocks experienced, the GDP 
growth spectrum of one economy will lie proportionately below that of another at all 
frequency ranges. The reason is that a covariance-stationary series, such as output 
growth, can be expressed as an infinite moving-average (MA) process whose spectrum is 
proportional to the innovation variance. Therefore, the lower volatility of shocks can be 
interpreted as a lower innovation variance with the same MA coefficients for two 
economies. Given that a particular component of the variance is the integral of the 
spectrum over the respective frequency ranges, both the long-run and business cycle 
components of the variance will be lower for the country experiencing lower volatility of 
shocks.  
Conversely, if change in volatility is solely due to change in propagation 
mechanism, such as financial development, this would be manifested in the contour of 
the spectrum (Ahmed, et al., 2004, p. 824). One would expect that, ceteris paribus, the 
country having developed financial markets will have disproportionately lower variance 
at the business cycle than at other frequencies relative to that of a country having less 
developed financial markets. Therefore, the variance at the business cycle frequency 
range will be influenced by financial development. If better business practices such as 
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better inventory management that smooth output in the short-run is mainly responsible 
for lower volatility, variance will be lower primarily at relatively high frequencies. 
Measurement errors would also be reflected in the high frequency range. Finally, if a 
lower volatility is due to a combination of changes in both shocks and propagation 
mechanism, one spectrum will lie below another disproportionately at some frequency 
range depending on the relative importance of the factors.  
The above econometric argument can also be supplemented by predictions of 
growth models. The main argument is that shocks generate long-run volatility but 
financial development does not.  The real business cycle (RBC) models cannot explain 
persistence volatility unless shocks are very volatile and persistent.  In endogenous 
growth models, shocks generate persistent volatility. For example, in Fatás (2002), 
expected profitability of innovation depends on aggregate demand, and negative shocks 
to aggregate demand reduce the incentive to innovate.  When the economy gets out of 
recession, innovation is permanently lower and therefore, output remains at a 
permanently low level. Economic downturns also impact negatively on the amount of 
learning by doing that permanently lowers the steady state growth rate (Stadler, 1986; 
1990).  
There are several models that explain the role of financial development in 
business cycle volatility but long-run volatility does not occur in standard situations. The 
best example can be Aghion and Banerjee (2005) where long-run volatility is a remote 
possibility for intermediate level of financial development. They show that financial 
underdevelopment interacts with interest rate (or real exchange rate in open economy) to 
generate volatility but volatility can be persistent (in the sense that an economy exhibits 
limit cycles) only in the countries at the medium level of financial development. 
Investments and borrowing are higher in a boom that leads to higher interest rate. But 
higher interest rate also creates a pecuniary externality as it increases the debt burden of 
all entrepreneurs, which slows down growth of entrepreneur’s wealth and investment 
capacity. At some point, investment capacity falls below total savings, the economy 
enters recession and interest rate will eventually fall. The process will then revert to a 
boom. But only countries at intermediate level of financial development may experience 
limit cycles. In a highly financially underdeveloped country entrepreneurs rely entirely on 
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their retained earnings for investment. On the other hand, financially developed countries 
will not also experience long-run volatility because firms can invest up to the expected 
net present value of their project since they face no credit constraints.  
Based on the above discussions, this paper aims to test two hypotheses. First, a 
country with developed financial markets will experience lower business cycle 
component of growth volatility but the long-run component will not be affected by such 
development. The effect on total volatility will, therefore, depend on the share of the 
business cycle component in total volatility. Second, a country experiencing lower shocks 
will have both lower business cycle and long-run components of volatility and, therefore, 
lower total volatility. Our measure of financial development is the private sector credit by 
bank and other financial institutions as a percentage of GDP. We also check the 
robustness using an alternative measure—value of total stock market capitalization as a 
percentage of GDP. Both measures are standard in the literature. We use changes in the 
terms of trade (TOT) defined as the ratio of export prices to import prices as a proxy 
measure of shocks, which is considered as exogenous to a country.  
Empirical evidence provides qualified support for our hypotheses. After 
controlling for country specific fixed factors and the effects of possible outliers, we find, 
in a sample of 79 countries for the period 1980-2004, that higher private credit dampens 
the business cycle component of volatility but not the long-run component, while a TOT 
deterioration (improvement) magnifies (dampens) both business cycle and long-run 
components of volatility. The role of higher private credit in reducing volatility is not 
found to be important for the high income countries when examined at different stages of 
economic development. However, when we construct a two-period panel only for 
selected OECD countries for which longer period of data are available, we find that 
higher private credit reduces business cycle volatility for these countries as well. When 
private credit is replaced by value of stock market capitalization, we find a robust 
negative effect only for the low-income countries. All results are robust to corrections for 
reverse causality.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly discusses different 
channels through which financial development dampens growth volatility, reviews 
empirical works and explains the motivation for investigating different volatility 
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components. We discuss estimation of different components of volatility in the frequency 
domain, data and summary statistics at the cross-country level in section III. In section 
IV, we present our findings. Finally, section V concludes.   
 
II. Related literature and motivation  
The existing literature describes several routes through which financial 
development and shocks might impact on volatility.  
Developed financial markets and institutions lessen separation between savers and 
investors and facilitate diversification which has implications for growth volatility. In 
Aghion et al. (1999) savings exceed investment during periods of slow growth resulting 
in low demand for savings and therefore low equilibrium interest rates, which in turn 
implies that investors can retain large portion of their profits and expand investment. This 
process continues until investment increases sufficiently to put upward pressure on 
interest rates. Then the process is reversed taking the economy back to a period of slower 
growth. The higher the degree of separation between savers and investors, the larger is 
the growth volatility. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) argue that in the early stages of 
development indivisibility of investment limits the degree of diversification of 
idiosyncratic risk that discourages investment in risky projects which are more 
productive. This slows down capital accumulation and introduces large growth volatility. 
However, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) did not find support that low income countries 
invest in safe projects; rather, these countries’ investment is concentrated in more volatile 
sectors. 
Financial development also reduces volatility by reducing cost of acquiring 
information and improving risk management. Underdeveloped financial markets are 
characterized by imperfect information and costly enforcement of contracts that interfere 
with smooth functioning of the financial market. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and 
Bernanke et al. (1998) argue the balanced sheet (or net worth) channel of the firm in 
mitigating business cycle volatility as imperfect information and costly enforcement of 
contracts create ―external finance premium‖ that is a wedge between the cost of external 
funds and the opportunity cost of internal funds. Tighter monetary policy exacerbates the 
borrower balance sheet problem thus amplifying and propagating the business cycle. This 
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problem will be more pronounced in the financially underdeveloped countries where 
―external finance premium‖ is greater. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) also develop 
models in which developed financial markets dampen volatility by reducing information.  
In Aizenman and Powell (2003) a weak legal system interacts with high costs for 
information verification leading to a first-order effect of volatility on production, 
employment and welfare. Their calibration illustrates that a 1% increase in the coefficient 
of variation of productivity shocks would reduce welfare by more than 1%. However, 
these are not models of persistent business cycle. 
Aghion et al. (2007) try to bridge the apparent disjoint between long-run growth 
and business cycles models. In their model the share of long-term investment is 
countercyclical when the capital market is perfect but becomes procyclical with an 
imperfect capital market. Since long-term investment enhances productivity more than 
short-term investment, this implies that the cyclical behavior of the composition of 
investment mitigates fluctuations when financial markets are perfect, but amplifies them 
when credit constraints are sufficiently tight.  
 There are several studies that empirically investigate the role of financial 
development and shocks in growth volatility with mixed support. Easterly et al. (2002) 
find that financial development (as measured by private credit to GDP) lowers growth 
volatility but in a nonlinear fashion. Financial development reduces volatility up to a 
point, but too much private credit can increase volatility. Kunieda (2008) also finds a 
nonlinear relationship in that financial development has a hump-shaped effect on growth 
volatility. In early stages of financial development, growth rates are less volatile. As the 
financial sector develops, an economy becomes highly volatile but becomes less volatile 
once again as financial sector matures. Lopez and Spiegel (2002), Denizer et al. (2002), 
Silva (2002), and Tharavanij (2007) also confirm a negative relationship between 
financial development and growth volatility.  
Raddatz (2006) examines US industry level data and finds that financial 
development leads to a comparatively larger reduction in the volatility of output in 
sectors with high liquidity needs. Phumiwasana (2003) finds evidence that bank-based 
financial system increases the volatility among developed countries, while decreases 
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volatility among developing countries. However, Silva (2002) finds that bank-based or 
market-based financial structure is unimportant in explaining growth volatility.  
On the other hand, Tiryaki (2003) and Beck et al. (2006) do not a find relationship 
between financial development and growth volatility. Acemoglu et al. (2003) suggest that 
distortionary macroeconomic policies are symptoms of underlying institutional problems 
rather than main causes of economic volatility. They find that financial aspects become 
insignificant for explaining volatility once the effect of institutions are controlled. These 
results contrast the mechanisms behind the difference in cross-country growth volatility 
explained above.  
Beck et al. (2006) investigate the channels through which financial development 
potentially affects growth volatility. They find inflation volatility magnifies growth 
volatility in countries with low level of financial development but no effect in the 
countries with better financial system. They also find weak evidence for a dampening 
effect of financial intermediary development on the impact of TOT volatility. Aghion et 
al. (2007) use a panel data of 21 OECD countries over the 1960-2000 period and find that 
the impact of commodity price shocks on the long-run investment (share of structural 
investment is their proxy) is more negative in countries with lower private credit. In 
contrast, they find no such effect in the case of overall investment rate. 
 The literature discussed above invariably uses the standard deviation of the per 
capita GDP growth as the measure of volatility
3
 without making any distinction between 
its different components. In the following, we argue that this aggregate measure of 
volatility is not informative because financial development and shocks impact on total 
volatility through its different components.  
Assuming that the output growth series is covariance stationary, its variance can 
be expressed as the integral of the spectrum of the series, ( )g  , across all frequencies 
     . A country with lower growth variance would have a spectrum lying below 
the one for the country with higher growth variance. It does not necessarily mean that the 
spectrum will lay below at all frequency ranges; the area under the spectrum will be 
smaller. Distribution of the two spectra across different frequency ranges provides useful 
                                                 
3
 Silva (2002) and Tharavanij (2007) are exceptions who use band-pass filtered series. None of the papers 
decomposes volatility into different components.  
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information about the relative volatility at different frequency ranges. Ahmed et al. 
(2004, p. 825) exploits this information to explain the reduction in different components 
of volatility of US GDP growth and inflation for two distinct periods, and the relative 
importance of improved monetary policy, exogenous shocks and improved inventory 
practices in explaining the reduced volatility. This argument can be extended to explain 
varying degree of growth volatility at the cross-country level.
4
  
To understand this, suppose that two countries experience different magnitude of 
the volatility of shocks; otherwise, they are similar in terms of their structural features. 
Then the spectra of the output growth for the two countries will be of similar shape but 
the spectrum of the country experiencing lower volatility of shocks will lay 
proportionately below the other at all frequency ranges. This can be explained by Wold’s 
theorem, which suggests that output growth, assuming it as covariance-stationary, can be 
expressed as an infinite moving-average (MA) process. Since the spectrum of any MA 
series is proportional to its innovation variance, the country experiencing lower volatility 
of shocks will have lower innovation variance than the other but the MA coefficients will 
be the same. Given that a particular component of the variance is the integral of the 
spectrum over the respective frequency ranges, all components of the variance will be 
lower for the country experiencing lower volatility of shocks. This hypothesis can be 
analyzed more precisely using the concept of the normalized spectrum, 2( ) ( ) /h g   , 
that indicates the fraction of the total variance, 
2 , occurring at each frequency. The 
normalized spectrum is invariant to the magnitude of the innovation variance because 
both ( )g   and 2  are proportional to the innovation variance. Therefore, the two 
normalized spectra will be the same.  
The argument that shocks generate long-run volatility can also be explained by 
endogenous growth theory. For example, in Fatás (2002) optimal research depends on the 
expected profitability of innovation (or imitation) which is a function of aggregate 
demand. Negative shocks to aggregate demand reduce the incentive to innovate and as a 
result when the economy recovers from recession output does not revert to the trend 
rather remains at a permanent low level. In Stadler (1986, 1990) economic downturns 
                                                 
4
 The following discussion is drawn on Ahmed et al. (2004).  
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impact negatively on the amount of learning by doing that also generate persistence 
fluctuations. In Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), a negative shock to profit decreases 
investment which in turn reduces the price of collateral. This increases borrowing 
constraints on investors thus deteriorating investment capacity which amplifies the 
negative shock on profit. A negative serial correlation in aggregate output is thus 
generated. 
In contrast, if the structures of the two economies differ, the spectrum of the low-
volatility country will lie below disproportionately at the business cycle and higher 
frequencies. For example, if the lower variance is due mainly to better business practices 
such as better inventory management that smooth output on a quarter-by-quarter basis, 
variance will be lower primarily at relatively high frequencies. Measurement errors 
would also be reflected in these frequencies.  If financial development dampens business 
cycle fluctuations, as we have discussed above, one would expect that a country having 
developed financial markets will have its spectrum disproportionately lower at the 
business cycle than at other frequencies relative to that of a country having less 
developed financial markets. Therefore, a country with developed financial markets will 
have lower business cycle component of the variance than another.  
Financial development impacts on long-run growth by reducing information and 
transaction costs, which in turn influences saving and investment decisions and 
technological innovation (Levine, 1997, p. 689) but its effect on long-run volatility is not 
clear. Aghion and Banerjee (2005) develop a model that is capable of generating 
endogenous volatility in an economy with credit constraints but long-run volatility can be 
a possibility only for countries at the intermediate level of financial development. The 
basic mechanism in their model is the interaction of credit constraints and endogenous 
changes in the interest rate. Investments and borrowing are higher in a boom that leads to 
higher interest rate. But higher interest rate also creates a pecuniary externality as it 
increases the debt burden of all entrepreneurs, which slows down growth of 
entrepreneur’s wealth and investment capacity. At some point, investment capacity falls 
below total savings and the economy enters recession and interest rate will decrease. The 
process will then revert to a boom. However, in a highly underdeveloped country 
entrepreneurs rely entirely on their retained earnings for investment. Conversely, in 
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financially developed countries firms face no credit constraints and thus can invest up to 
the expected net present value of their project. Therefore, financially developed or 
underdeveloped countries will not experience long-run volatility leaving vulnerable the 
countries at the intermediate level of financial development. This result also holds in the 
context of open economy where the relevant price is the real exchange. 
Finally, if a lower volatility is due to a combination of changes in both shocks and 
propagation mechanism, one spectrum will lie below another disproportionately at some 
frequency range depending on the relative importance of these two. 
 The above motivation allows us to test the following two hypotheses:  
1. Financial development affects only the business cycle component of volatility and 
therefore, the effect on total volatility depends on the relative magnitude of its 
business cycle component, and 
2. Shocks affect both the long-run and business cycle components of volatility and 
therefore, total volatility.  
 
III. Volatility at the cross-country level 
 In this section, we briefly explain the spectral method that is employed to extract 
variance at different frequency range. We then present the summary statistics of different 
variance components.  
 
III.A Estimation in the frequency domain 
The variance of output growth can be expressed as the integral of the spectrum of 
this series, ( )g  , across all frequencies      . The spectrum is symmetric around 
zero so that only the frequency range 0     becomes relevant. The novelty of 
spectral method is that it provides a simple yet elegant way to decompose the total 
variance into different components. For example, the long-run component of the variance 
will be the integral of the spectrum over the long-run frequency range.
5
 The business 
                                                 
5
 The long-run component of the variance is equivalent to passing the GDP growth series through a low-
pass filter, and then estimating the variance of the resulting series (Levy and Dezhbakhsh, 2003, p. 1502). It 
is also a measure of persistence of volatility. Another way to estimate the persistence is Cochrane’s (1988) 
variance ratio statistic. Similarly, business cycle (short-run) component of the variance is equivalent to 
passing the GDP growth series through a band-pass (high-pass) filter, and then estimating the variance of 
the resulting series. 
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cycle and short-run components can also be extracted in a similar way by integrating the 
spectrum over the relevant frequency ranges. The sum of the three variance 
components—long-run, business cycle, and short-run—add to the total variance of the 
series. It is important to note that any variance component is orthogonal to other 
components because the covariance between spectral estimates at different frequencies is 
zero. 
Suppose, tx  is a covariance-stationary series. The periodogram, which is the 
sample analog of the spectrum, is given by:  
1 1
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 
    , and represents the 
variance of the series tx  attributed to the frequency range 1 2    . The frequency,  , 
is inversely related to periodicity or cycle length according to 2 /p   . The frequency 
ranges of the long-run, business cycle and short-run are given respectively, by 10    , 
1 2    , and 2    , where values of 1 and 2  for annual series are chosen to 
be 0.786 and 2.09,  respectively. These cut-off frequencies are chosen following modern 
business cycle literature in that the long-run corresponds to cycles of 8 years or longer, 
and the business cycle corresponds to cycles of 3 to 8 years (Baxter and King, 1999). 
Therefore, low frequency is related to long-run
7
 and high frequency is related to short-
run.  
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 Variance of tx  is given by 
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 , which slightly differs from 0ˆ  because of different 
denominators in the two formulas.  
7
 Ahmed et al. (2004) argue that periodogram at low frequencies is subject to greater sampling variation. 
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The periodogram is an asymptotically unbiased estimate of the spectrum 
(Priestley, 1981; p.693). But this is inconsistent because the variance of ˆ( )g   does not 
tend to zero as T tends to infinity (Priestley, 1981, p. 432). The reason is that although 
ˆ( )g  involves T sample autocovariances and the variance of each is of order (1/T), the 
combined effect of the T terms produces a variance of order 1. One way to reduce the 
variance is to specify a ―spectral window‖, i.e. truncating the periodogram at some 
point )1(  TM . We use Bartlett’s window that assigns linearly decreasing weights to 
the autocovariances in the neighborhood of frequency considered and zero thereafter. The 
number of ordinates, M, is set using the rule 2M T (Levy and Dezhbakhsh, 2003, p. 
1527).
8
 
 
III.B Data and Descriptive statistics 
Growth rate is calculated by taking the first-difference of the log of real per capita 
GDP.
9
 Calculation of the growth variance requires collapsing several years of GDP 
growth data. Data on private credit are not available for many countries for a long period. 
Given that data come from different sources, we choose the time period 1980-2004 for 
the analysis so that GDP and private credit data are available for relatively longer period 
for a good number of countries. There are 116 such countries among which, according to 
the World Bank classification, there are 39, 50 and 27 low income, middle income and 
high income countries respectively. However, data for the control variables used in the 
regressions are not available for many countries for that period especially for many 
developing countries; therefore, the sample size reduces to 79 countries for which data 
for all variables are available (29, 32 and 18 low, middle and high income countries 
respectively). Appendix A.1 provides description of all variables, their sources, and time 
periods. For several OECD countries, all data are available for a longer period of time. 
                                                 
8
 However, Engle (1974, p.3) and Priestly (1981, p. 471) argued that the integrated periodogram is 
consistent, not because it approaches its spectral value at each frequency, but because the sum (integral) of 
the periodogram over all frequencies approaches the sum (integral) of the spectral values, which is the 
variance attributed to frequency ranges. Priestly (1981, p. 483) mentions that both approaches—with and 
without spectral window—are equivalent as far as their asymptotic sampling properties are concerned.   
9
 For an interesting debate on the measurement of the average growth rate, see Chatterjee and Shukayev 
(2005) and Ramey and Ramey (2006).  
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We split the sample period into two intervals—1960-1979 and 1980-2004—to construct a 
two period panel for this set of countries.
10
   
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of different components of the variance of 
GDP growth and their relative shares for 116 countries (variances for all sample countries 
are listed in Appendices A.2-A.4). Mean total variance is decreasing with income level. It 
is 32.9, 26.7 and 9.6 for the low, middle and high income countries, respectively. The 
mean value of business cycle component of the variance follows a similar pattern (13.5, 
11.1 and 3.7, respectively).  The mean value of long-run component is the same in the 
low and middle income countries at 8.3, while it is almost half in the high income 
countries. Note that the long-run component of the variance is one way of representing 
the degree of shock persistence (Levy and Dezhbakhsh, 2003, p. 1500-01). This then 
implies no difference in shock persistence between the low and middle income countries 
but the high income countries are about half shock persistent than other countries. The 
high income countries include both OECD and non-OECD countries. For the 20 OECD 
countries (column 6), the mean value of the variance at each frequency range is lower 
than that for all high income countries implying higher variance for the non-OECD high 
income countries.  
However, another pattern emerges if we examine the share of different variance 
components. For example, the mean share of the long-run component is increasing while 
the mean share of the short-run component is decreasing with income level. The mean 
share of the business cycle component is almost the same for low and middle income 
countries (0.42 vs. 0.41) and is slightly lower for the high income countries (0.39). This 
finding contrasts Levy and Dezhbakhsh (2003), who find a statistically significant 
positive relationship between income level and the share of the business cycle component 
of the variance (their Table 6 in p. 1519). Their sample period (1950-1994) and set of 
                                                 
10
 Choice of this break point is based on convenience rather than statistical test as it divides the sample 
period in almost two equal halves. Cecchetti et al. (2005, Table 1 in p. 118) found structural break in 
growth volatility in only 16 of 25 developed countries and for most countries break took place at around 
1981-85. 
 16 
countries are different from ours. To compare their results with ours, we compute the 
shares for the same set of countries as Levy and Dezhbakhsh for the period 1960-2004 
and report the results in Table 2.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
We find that mean share of the business cycle component is marginally increasing 
with income level. However, for this set of countries, total variance and also its long-run 
and business cycle components are larger for the middle income than low income 
countries. This implies that results may be driven by the choice of sample countries and 
time period because Levy and Dezhbakhsh sample period excludes more recent crises 
including the East Asian one. We therefore also report the statistics of the 79 countries 
included in the regressions (Table 3). Results follow similar patterns in our two samples 
(116 countries vs. 79 countries) with the only exception that mean shock persistence 
(long-run component of the variance) is now slightly lower in the middle income than 
low income countries. It is also evident that in both samples the business cycle 
component of the variance dominates in the cases of low and middle income countries, 
while it is the long-run component that dominates in the case of high income countries. 
On the other hand, in Levy and Dezhbakhsh (2003) sample, the business cycle 
component dominates in the case of all income categories.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
  There is also a difference in the mean private credit to GDP ratio (which is the 
time series average for each country for the 1980-2004 period) in the two samples. In the 
sample of 116 countries, the mean is the lowest for the middle income countries (0.38), 
while in the reduced sample of 79 countries it is clearly increasing with the income level. 
In the latter sample the mean values are 0.38, 0.40 and 0.45 for the low, middle and high 
income countries, respectively. The same applies to the initial mean value of private 
credit to GDP ratio in 1980. It is also evident that the low and middle income countries 
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on average experience negative TOT shocks, while the high income countries 
experienced positive TOT shocks.  
 
IV. Empirical analysis  
 
IV.A Estimation method 
We follow a simple estimation method in line with other kindred studies in which 
we regress long-run and business cycle components of the volatility of the growth rate of 
per capita real GDP on financial development, shocks and other variables related to the 
growth variances. The equations we estimate are as follows:  
 
_ _i i i i iGrVol bc const fin dev shock X        γ   --- (1) 
_ _i i i i iGrVol lr const fin dev shock X        γ   --- (2) 
_ _i i i i iGrVol total const fin dev shock X        γ   --- (3) 
 
Here, _ iGrVol bc , _ iGrVol lr , and _ iGrVol total  are the business cycle, long-run, and 
the total volatility of the growth rate of real per capita GDP in country i, respectively. We 
first calculate variance (and its components) using spectral method, and then take the 
square root to calculate volatility. This has been done because in the literature the 
standard deviation is used as the measure of volatility. As a measure of financial 
development ( _ ifin dev ), we use (log) the value of credit disbursed to the private sector 
by banks and other financial institutions relative to GDP. It is preferred to other measures 
of financial development because it excludes credit extended to the public sector and 
funds provided from central or development banks (Aghion, 2007, p. 17). As a part of 
robustness checks, we also use an alternative market-based measure—the value of stock 
market capitalization relative to GDP. Our proxy for the shock variable is the change in 
the terms of trade (TOT) defined as the ratio of export prices to import prices.  
The TOT is exogenous to a country and, therefore, a change in TOT can be considered as 
an exogenous shock. This proxy is also standard in the literature.   
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Other controls ( iX ) include (log) the initial level of per capital real GDP, the 
initial high school enrolment rate that is intended to account for human capital, black 
market premium on foreign exchange that accounts for the market distortions, openness 
measured as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage GDP, and ―polity score‖, 
which is used as a proxy for institutions. All the variables in iX  (excluding the initial 
values) are averaged over the period 1980-2004. The institution variable is intended to 
isolate the effect of financial development from other institutional characteristics (Aghion 
et. al., 2007, p. 19). Acemoglu et al. (2003) suggest that distortionary macroeconomic 
policies are symptoms of underlying institutional problems rather than main causes of 
economic volatility. They find that financial aspects become insignificant for explaining 
volatility once the effect of institutions are controlled. Mobarak (2005) also finds that 
higher levels of democracy and diversification lower volatility. The ―polity score‖ is an 
index taken from Polity-IV dataset that captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-
point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). It 
examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing 
institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance.  
We also include country characteristics such as latitude, dummies for tropical and 
landlocked countries and legal origins. Some regions, such as East Asia and Latin 
America, have experienced severe economic crises than others and crises in some regions 
are also more frequent. In order to control for the effect of the outliers, we also include 
regional dummies.  
 
IV.B Benchmark Results  
Although the dependent variables are ―generated‖, measurement errors are 
unlikely to influence our results for two reasons. First, the effect of measurement errors in 
the dependent variable is not statistically serious in the classical sense as these are 
absorbed into the residual term. Second, measurement errors corrupt estimates at the high 
frequency range. We focus on the long-run and business cycle components of the 
variance that exclude high frequency components. However, total variance, as in other 
studies, consists of all three components, and may be subject to measurement errors.  
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Insert Table 4 here 
 
Table 4 reports the results for equation (1) where business cycle volatility is the 
dependent variable and credit to the private sector relative to GDP is the measure of 
financial development.  Columns 2-6 report results for various combinations of the 
explanatory variables. In all regressions, the coefficient of private credit is negative and 
statistically significant at least at 10% level. The significance level increases to 5% when 
country specific fixed factors and regional dummies are controlled for. The magnitude of 
the coefficient is -0.38 when all controls are included.  This implies that increasing the 
(log) private credit from the 25th (-1.772) to the 75th (-0.528) percentile results in 0.48 
percentage point decrease in business cycle volatility. However, private credit alone can 
explain only 2% of the variation in business cycle volatility.  
The coefficient of TOT change enters negatively and significantly at least at 5% 
level in all regressions. Therefore, the results support our argument that both financial 
development and TOT change reduce business cycle volatility.  The coefficient of TOT 
change when all controls are included is -19.036 implying that if TOT improves from the 
25th (-0.020) to the 75th (0.003) percentile, business cycle volatility reduces by 0.44 
percentage point. 
In columns 7-11, we replicate the results in column 2-6 by disaggregating 
financial development into three stages of economic development—low, middle and high 
income. Equation (1) is rewritten as:  
_ _i j ij i i i
j
GrVol bc const fin dev shock X         γ  --- (1a) 
where j represents low, middle and high income countries. This is equivalent to 
multiplying financial development by dummies for low, middle and high income 
countries. We find a negative and significant coefficient of financial development for the 
low income countries in all regressions. For the middle income countries, statistical 
significance is not robust. The coefficient is significant only if all controls are excluded 
or all of them but regional dummies are included. The coefficient of the high income 
countries is significant but positive only in the simple regression of no control. Change in 
TOT enters negatively and significantly again in all regressions.  
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Insert Table 5 here 
 
Table 5 reports results of equation (2) with the long-run component of growth 
volatility as the dependent variable. We also estimate kindred equation disaggregating 
financial development.  
_ _i j ij i i i
j
GrVol lr const fin dev shock X         γ   --- (2a) 
 Neither the coefficient of private credit nor that for different stages of economic 
development is significant. However, the coefficient of TOT change is negative and 
significant at least at 5% level in all regressions. This supports our argument that shocks 
affect both long-run and business cycle volatility while financial development affects 
only business cycle volatility. With all controls, the coefficient of TOT change is -18.653 
implying that if TOT improves from the 25th (-0.020) to the 75th (0.003) percentile long-
run volatility reduces by 0.43 percentage point, which is almost the same as the 
magnitude of decrease in business cycle volatility. 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
We now estimate equation (3) in which total volatility is the dependent variable, 
and the kindred equation disaggregating financial development.  
_ _i j ij i i i
j
GrVol total const fin dev shock X         γ  --- (3a) 
Results, reported in Table 6, show that the significance of financial development is 
fragile in different combinations of the control variables. This is because total volatility 
consists of all components and, as we have shown, financial development has no 
explanatory power in explaining the long-run component.  The robustness of TOT change 
is again confirmed.  
 
Insert Table 7 here 
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IV.C Correction for reverse causality 
Using both growth volatility and average financial development over the same 
period does not account for their potential endogenous determination. To take this into 
account, the initial value of the financial development is now used. Results are reported 
in Tables 7 for business cycle volatility (equations (1) and (1a)). The coefficient of initial 
financial development is always negative; although it is not significant in all 
combinations of the explanatory variables, it is significant with all controls and after 
accounting for country specific fixed factors and possibility of outliers (captured by 
regional dummy), as shown in columns 5-6. When initial financial development at 
different development stages are used as regressors (columns 7-11), results differ from 
those in columns 7-11 of Table 4. Financial development mitigates business cycle 
volatility in middle income countries with weak robustness, while the result is not robust 
for low income countries. The coefficient of TOT change is negative and highly 
significant in all specifications. Tables 8 reports results for the long-run volatility as the 
dependent variable (equations (2) and (2a)). Results follow those in Table 5 with no 
significant effect of the initial financial development, and continued and robust 
significance of the TOT change. Finally, when total variance is used as the dependent 
variable, results are more or less the same as those without correcting reverse causality 
(Table 9).  
 
Insert Tables 8 and 9 here 
 
We also find in these regressions that market distortions measured by black 
market premium on foreign exchange increases the long-run volatility and openness 
increases the business cycle volatility but the latter significance is not robust.  
 
IV.D Sensitivity analysis 
To check the robustness of the previous results, we use the value of the stock 
market capitalization relative to GDP as an alternative measure of financial development. 
As before, our dependent variables are business cycle, long-run and total volatility. We 
first estimate a simple model using the time average of the stock market capitalization. 
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We also estimate the model using the initial value of stock market capitalization to 
account for reverse causality.  
 
Insert Table 10 here 
 
Table 10 reports results for the business cycle volatility as the dependent variable 
(equations (1) and (1a)). The coefficient of financial development is negative but not 
significant in columns 2-6 (equations (1)). However, when we estimate equation (1a), we 
find that financial development reduces business cycle volatility in the low income 
countries (columns 7-11). This result is robust in all regressions. No such effect is found 
for the middle or high income countries. Change in TOT is also negative and significant 
in all regressions. Results for the long-run volatility are presented in Table 11. The 
coefficient of financial development at both aggregate or disaggregate level is 
insignificant, but the coefficient of TOT change appears negatively significant and 
weakly robust. Results for total variance presented in Table 12 mimic that for long-run 
variance.  
Insert Tables 11 and 12 here 
 
These models are also estimated accounting for reverse causality where the 
relevant variable is the initial value of stock market capitalization. Results for the 
business cycle volatility as the dependent variable are reported in Table 13. Results do 
not qualitatively change from those without such correction. The coefficient of initial 
value of stock market capitalization for the low income countries is negative and robustly 
significant although the magnitude of the coefficient is now smaller. When the long-run 
volatility is used as the dependent variable, the coefficient is significantly negative for the 
low income countries in some specifications but its robustness does not survive when the 
effects of country specific factors and outliers are controlled for (Table 14). Much similar 
results are obtained in the case of total variance (Table 15). Note that stock market 
capitalization data for the period considered are available for smaller number of countries 
so that sample size reduces to 51 when all controls are included.  
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Insert Tables13-15 here 
 
Although we find support for the mitigating effect on business cycle volatility of 
private credit and stock market capitalization both relative to GDP, there is a difference 
in the pattern. Stock market capitalization explains business cycle volatility better when 
disaggregated at different stages of economic development, while private credit explains 
better without such disaggregation. It is important to note that the former represents 
market-based and the latter represents bank-based financial development. Stock markets 
provide a different bundle of financial services from those provided by banks and other 
financial intermediaries. For example, stock markets mainly diversify risk and boost 
liquidity.  Banks, on the other hand, reduce the cost of information acquisition and 
enhance corporate governance. But there are also important overlaps between the services 
provided by these two types of financial systems (Levine, 1997, p. 719). We do not 
explore the reason for such difference in the results; our objective is not to compare the 
performance of these two types of financial development. 
As another robustness check, we estimate a panel for only 20 OECD countries for 
which data for longer period are available. The two sample intervals are 1960-79 and 
1980-2004.  
 
Insert Table 16 here 
 
In the panel estimation, we exclude regional dummies because most developed 
countries are from Europe and North America. Initial private credit is the explanatory 
variable so the model is corrected for reverse causality. In columns 2-4 of Table 16, we 
report results for business cycle volatility as the dependent variable (equation (1). 
Hausman test suggests fixed-effect estimation in all specifications. We find that financial 
development reduces business cycle volatility and this result is robust. However, we do 
not find any significant effect of TOT change in reducing business cycle volatility. This 
result may occur because there is little variation in the TOT change for the developed 
countries in the sample. With long-run volatility as the dependent variable, Hausman test 
suggests fixed effect estimation (column 5) when only financial development is included 
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but random effect estimation if other controls are included (columns 6a-7a). In all 
estimations, the coefficient of financial development is insignificant. Change in TOT is 
negative but its significance is not robust.  
We do not find any evidence that financial development dampens the effects of 
shocks on (any component of) volatility (results not reported). When we add an 
interaction term of TOT change and financial development the coefficient of the 
interaction term is not significant and its sign alters in different specifications. However, 
the inclusion of the interaction term does not change the results reported in the paper.  
 
V. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we argue that the study of the effect of financial development and 
shocks on aggregate growth volatility will not be informative because they affect growth 
volatility through its different components. Specifically, we argue that financial 
development affects only the business cycle volatility and therefore, the effect on total 
volatility is dependent on its share in total volatility. On the contrary, shocks affect total 
volatility through both its long-run and business cycle components.  
Assuming that GDP growth is covariance-stationary, we decompose its variance 
into business cycle and long-run components using spectral method. Unlike other studies 
that use the total variance of GDP growth as the measure of volatility and regress it on 
financial development and shocks, we estimate the effect on different components of 
volatility separately. After controlling for, among others, country characteristics and 
possible outliers, results suggest that higher private credit, which is used as proxy for 
financial development, dampens the business cycle volatility but not the long-run 
volatility. Shocks, as measured by changes in TOT, affect both business cycle and long-
run volatility. Improvement (deterioration) in TOT mitigates (magnifies) both volatility 
components. These results are robust to alternative market-based measure of financial 
development, and corrections for reverse causality.  
  These results have important implications for growth theory. It is imperative to 
distinguish the factors that cause permanent and transitory deviations from the steady 
state growth rate. Previous studies fail to address this issue. Our findings shed some lights 
on this by investigating two important factors—financial development and shocks. 
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Spectral analysis has also been found to be useful in separating different volatility 
components and can be used in other areas that are concerned with the importance of 
different cycle lengths.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics (for the period 1980-2004) 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Low income Middle income High income All  OECD 
Total variance  32.90 (24.13) 26.65 (19.62)  9.57 (11.80)  24.77 (21.59)  5.86 (5.65) 
LR variance  8.37 (7.13)  8.33 (7.88)  4.10 (5.81)  7.36 (7.36)  2.57 (2.68) 
BC variance  13.50 (10.36)  11.09 (8.54)  3.65 (4.25)  10.17 (9.20)  2.40 (2.43) 
SR variance  11.03 (10.04)  7.22 (5.84)  1.81 (2.23)  7.24 (7.79)  0.90 (1.13) 
LR variance share  0.26 (0.12)  0.32 (0.15)  0.43 (0.12)  0.32 (0.15)  0.45 (0.12) 
BC variance share  0.42 (0.11)  0.41 (0.10)  0.39 (0.07)  0.41 (0.09)  0.40 (0.06) 
SR variance share  0.33 (0.12)  0.27 (0.14)  0.18 (0.09)  0.27 (0.13)  0.15 (0.08) 
Private credit/GDP  0.42 (0.35)  0.38 (0.34)  0.47 (0.43)  0.41 (0.36)  0.46 (0.38) 
Private credit/GDP (initial) 0.32 (0.28)  0.29 (0.24)  0.39 (0.37)  0.33 (0.29)  0.38 (0.28) 
N 39 50 27 116 20 
(X + M)/GDP  58.44 (26.87)  
N = 37 
86.98 (39.29)  
N = 50 
92.75 (86.25)  
N = 24 
78.71 (51.88)  
N = 111 
57.76 (21.23) 
N = 20 
Black market Premium  178.36 (656.78)  
N = 38 
57.42 (156.89)  
N = 47 
1.30 (2.39)  
N = 27 
84.93 (398.74)  
N = 112 
17.76 (72.92) 
N = 20 
TOT change  -0.01 (0.02)  
N = 33 
-0.01 (0.01)  
N = 40 
0.003 (0.005)  
N = 21 
-0.008 (0.02)  
N = 94 
0.01 (0.007) 
0.02 N = 20 
Figures in the parentheses are standard deviations.  
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Table 2: Variance of different frequency range for Levy-Dezhbakhsh (2003) sample for the period 1960-2004 (the same income group 
classification as Levy-Dezhbakhsh.  
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Low income* Middle income High income All 
Total variance 19.94 (10.50) 21.36 (13.52) 7.84 (4.43) 15.32 (11.49) 
LR variance 5.95 (3.95) 6.65 (4.25) 3.00 (2.10) 4.93 (3.74) 
BC variance 8.27 (5.29) 9.06 (6.64) 3.30 (2.07) 6.44 (5.42) 
SR variance 5.72 (2.89) 5.65 (4.69) 1.53 (1.01) 3.95 (3.66) 
LR variance share 0.30 (0.13) 0.35 (0.12) 0.38 (0.12) 0.35 (0.12) 
BC variance share 0.40 (0.09) 0.41 (0.11) 0.43 (0.09) 0.42 (0.10) 
SR variance share 0.29 (0.09) 0.24 (0.09) 0.19 (0.061) 0.24 (0.09) 
N 15 17 23 55 
Figures in the parentheses are standard deviations.  
* In the original Levy-Dezhbakhsh sample, there are 18 low income countries—data for the period considered are not available for 3 countries (Guyana, 
Myanmar, and Zaire).  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics (for the period 1980-2004) for 79 countries  
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Low income Middle income High income All 
Total variance 29.53 (23.00) 21.44 (17.50) 5.08 (4.68) 20.68 (20.46) 
LR variance 7.13 (6.28) 6.63 (6.35) 2.05 (1.51) 5.77 (5.91) 
BC variance 11.74 (9.09) 9.43 (8.18) 2.11 (2.19) 8.61 (8.43) 
SR variance 10.66 (11.21) 5.38 (5.35) 0.92 (1.36) 6.30 (8.43) 
LR variance share 0.25 (0.10) 0.32 (0.16) 0.44 (0.12) 0.32 (0.15) 
BC variance share 0.41 (0.10) 0.42 (0.10) 0.40 (0.07) 0.41 (0.09) 
SR variance share 0.34 (0.13) 0.25 (0.15) 0.16 (0.08) 0.26 (0.15) 
Private credit/GDP  0.38 (0.30) 0.40 (0.36) 0.45 (0.36) 0.41 (0.34) 
Private credit/GDP (initial) 0.31 (0.26) 0.33 (0.26) 0.38 (0.25) 0.33 (0.25) 
(X + M)/GDP 57.61 (26.97) 75.10 (37.09) 79.19 (86.79) 69.61 (50.36) 
Black market Premium 222.95 (748.86) 81.44 (186.05) 1.26 (2.31) 115.12 (472.07) 
TOT change -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) 0.002 (0.006) -0.010 (0.02) 
N 29 32 18 79 
Figures in the parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 4: Dependent variable: Business cycle variance for the period 1980-2004  
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Private  credit  -0.218*  
(-1.80) 
-0.291*  
(-1.83) 
-0.312*  
(-1.90) 
-0.336**  
(-2.17) 
-0.384**  
(-2.44) 
     
Private  credit 
(low income) 
     -0.446**  
(-2.63) 
-0.446*  
(-1.90) 
-0.454*  
(-1.83) 
-0.386*  
(-1.87) 
-0.500**  
(-2.06) 
Private  credit 
(middle income) 
     -0.224*  
(-1.72) 
-0.296  
(-1.50) 
-0.320  
(-1.60) 
-0.349*  
(-1.77) 
-0.329  
(-1.57) 
Private  credit 
(high income) 
     0.533** 
(2.36) 
0.156  
(0.68) 
0.121  
(0.52) 
-0.141  
(-0.53) 
-0.223  
(-0.74) 
TOT change 
(shock) 
 -24.747***  
(-3.24) 
-25.352***  
(-3.31) 
-20.083*** 
 (-2.68) 
-19.036**  
(-2.33) 
 -25.234***  
(-3.00) 
-25.709*** 
 (-3.05) 
-20.252** 
 (-2.44) 
-20.772** 
 (-2.28) 
Black market 
premium 
  0.0002  
(1.23) 
0.0003  
(0.91) 
0.0002 
 (0.83) 
  0.0002  
(1.04) 
0.0002 
 (0.87) 
0.0002 
 (0.73) 
Openness   0.004**  
(2.12) 
0.001  
(0.43) 
0.003  
(0.92) 
  0.004**  
(1.99) 
0.001  
(0.48) 
0.002  
(0.85) 
R-square 0.023 0.353 0.374 0.487 0.563 0.161 0.375 0.395 0.491 0.567 
N 116 80 80 79 79 116 80 80 79 79 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Private credit = Ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP 
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Table 5: Dependent variable: Long-run variance for the period 1980-2004  
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Private  credit  -0.088  
(-0.77) 
-0.144  
(-1.03) 
-0.173  
(-1.23) 
-0.159  
(-1.20) 
-0.193  
(-1.52) 
     
Private  credit 
(low income) 
     -0.146  
(-0.86) 
-0.278  
(-1.37) 
-0.282  
(-1.37) 
-0.174  
(-0.97) 
-0.226  
(-1.00) 
Private  credit 
(middle income) 
     -0.124  
(-0.98) 
-0.127  
(-0.72) 
-0.162  
(-0.92) 
-0.139  
(-0.81) 
-0.145  
(-0.90) 
Private  credit 
(high income) 
     0.316 
(1.72) 
0.161 
 (0.71) 
0.095  
(0.43) 
-0.190  
(-0.86) 
-0.317  
(-1.25) 
TOT change 
(shock) 
 -21.113*** 
 (-2.95) 
-21.304*** 
 (-3.04) 
-17.326** 
 (-2.62) 
-18.653** 
 (-2.52) 
 -21.979***  
(-3.03) 
-21.922*** 
 (-3.11) 
-17.798*** 
 (-2.71) 
-20.121**  
(-2.63) 
Black market 
premium 
  0.001** 
 (2.59) 
0.0005** 
(2.00) 
0.0005* 
 (1.94) 
  0.001**  
(2.44) 
0.0005* 
 (1.95) 
0.0005*  
(1.79) 
Openness   0.001 
 (1.04) 
-0.001  
(-0.48) 
-0.000  
(-0.01) 
  0.001  
(0.98) 
-0.001  
(-0.50) 
-.0000  
(-0.01) 
R-square 0.005 0.220 0.271 0.396 0.508 0.051 0.238 0.284 0.397 0.512 
N 116 80 80 79 79 116 80 80 79 79 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2. 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Private credit = Ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP 
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Table 6: Dependent variable: Total variance for the period 1980-2004  
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Private  credit  -0.319* 
(-1.69) 
-0.363  
(-1.46) 
-0.403  
(-1.58) 
-0.400  
(-1.59) 
-0.452*  
(-1.81) 
     
Private  credit 
(low income) 
     -0.655**  
(-2.26) 
-0.603  
(-1.58) 
-0.614  
(-1.55) 
-0.464  
(-1.30) 
-0.582  
(-1.39) 
Private  credit 
(middle income) 
     -0.336*  
(-1.74) 
-0.336  
(-1.11) 
-0.382  
(-1.25) 
-0.379  
(-1.24) 
-0.367  
(-1.21) 
Private  credit 
(high income) 
     0.827** 
(2.55) 
0.195 
 (0.60) 
0.116  
(0.35) 
-0.297  
(-0.83) 
-0.396  
(-0.96) 
TOT change 
(shock) 
 -31.604**  
(-2.63) 
-32.250***  
(-2.70) 
-23.981*  
(-1.95) 
-21.196  
(-1.47) 
 -33.088**  
(-2.63) 
-33.440*** 
 (-2.68) 
-24.860*  
(-1.95) 
-23.847  
(-1.58) 
Black market 
premium 
  0.001**  
(2.43) 
0.001  
(1.63) 
0.001  
(1.62) 
  0.001  
(2.20) 
0.001  
(1.57) 
0.001  
(1.46) 
Openness   0.004 
 (1.62) 
-0.001  
(-0.16) 
0.001  
(0.32) 
  0.004  
(1.53) 
-0.001  
(-0.14) 
0.001  
(0.30) 
R-square 0.022 0.361 0.386 0.480 0.560 0.162 0.377 0.399 0.480 0.562 
N 116 80 80 79 79 116 80 80 79 79 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2. 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Private credit = Ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP 
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 
Table 7: Dependent variable: Business cycle variance for the period 1980-2004 (Initial value of Private credit is the explanatory 
variable) 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Initial private  credit  -0.301**  
(-2.35) 
-0.269  
(-1.56) 
-0.295  
(-1.63) 
-0.328*  
(-1.87) 
-0.357**  
(-2.05) 
     
Initial private  credit 
(low income) 
     -0.462***  
(-2.80) 
-0.382  
(-1.48) 
-0.399  
(-1.43) 
-0.334  
(-1.31) 
-0.473  
(-1.58) 
Initial private  credit 
(middle income) 
     -0.300**  
(-2.04) 
-0.261  
(-1.34) 
-0.292  
(-1.45) 
-0.343*  
(-1.68) 
-0.292  
(-1.50) 
Initial private  credit 
(high income) 
     0.413  
(1.57) 
0.257  
(0.84) 
0.224 
 (0.72) 
-0.140  
(-0.34) 
-0.290  
(-0.67) 
TOT change (shock)  -25.393*** 
 (-3.26) 
-26.008*** 
 (-3.33) 
-20.954*** 
 (-2.78) 
-20.113** 
 (-2.45) 
 -25.835*** 
 (-3.02) 
-26.327*** 
 (-3.06) 
-20.652** 
 (-2.47) 
-22.620**  
(-2.52) 
Black market 
premium 
  0.0002 
 (1.16) 
0.0002 
 (0.86) 
0.0002  
(0.75) 
  0.0002 
 (0.85) 
0.0002 
 (0.82) 
0.0002  
(0.60) 
Openness   0.004** 
 (2.12) 
0.001 
 (0.57) 
0.003  
(1.01) 
  0.004**  
(2.12) 
0.001  
(0.61) 
0.003  
(0.98) 
R-square 0.036 0.342 0.364 0.474 0.549 0.166 0.362 0.383 0.477 0.553 
N 114 79 79 78 78 114 79 79 78 78 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2. 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Private credit = Ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP 
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Table 8: Dependent variable: Long-run variance for the period 1980-2004 (Initial value of Private credit is the explanatory variable) 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Initial private  credit  -0.221   
(-1.62) 
-0.190  
(-1.20) 
-0.216  
(-1.36) 
-0.194  
(-1.22) 
-0.196  
(-1.29) 
     
Initial private  credit 
(low income) 
     -0.243  
(-1.42) 
-0.338  
(-1.57) 
-0.324  
(-1.45) 
-0.219  
(-0.99) 
-0.260  
(-0.94) 
Initial private  credit 
(middle income) 
     -0.254*  
(-1.70) 
-0.159  
(-0.87) 
-0.200  
(-1.10) 
-0.182  
(-0.99) 
-0.152  
(-0.91) 
Initial private  credit 
(high income) 
     0.108 
(0.35) 
0.341 
 (1.10) 
0.239  
(0.78) 
-0.121  
(-0.33) 
-0.320  
(-0.87) 
TOT change (shock)  -21.561*** 
 (-2.99) 
-21.800***  
(-3.08) 
-18.006*** 
 (-2.71) 
-19.315**  
(-2.54) 
 -22.661*** 
 (-3.07) 
-22.424*** 
 (-3.11) 
-18.396*** 
 (-2.76) 
-21.159**  
(-2.65) 
Black market 
premium 
  0.0005** 
(2.62) 
0.0005** 
(2.03) 
0.0005* 
 (1.90) 
  0.0005** 
(2.31) 
0.0005*  
(1.94) 
0.0004*  
(1.70) 
Openness   0.002  
(1.12) 
-0.001  
(-0.37) 
0.000 
 (0.03) 
  0.002  
(1.17) 
-0.001  
(-0.35) 
0.000  
(0.01) 
R-square 0.025 0.225 0.276 0.398 0.506 0.058 0.257 0.298 0.398 0.509 
N 114 79 79 78 78 114 79 79 78 78 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2. 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Private credit = Ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP 
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Table 9: Dependent variable: Total variance for the period 1980-2004 (Initial value of Private credit is the explanatory variable) 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Initial private  credit  -0.503**  
(-2.32) 
-0.409  
(-1.40) 
-0.451  
(-1.50) 
-0.457  
(-1.42) 
-0.471  
(-1.50) 
     
Initial private  credit 
(low income) 
     -0.772***  
(-2.68) 
-0.684  
(-1.52) 
-0.689  
(-1.45) 
-0.559  
(-1.15) 
-0.716  
(-1.25) 
Initial private  credit 
(middle income) 
     -0.479**  
(-2.16) 
-0.330  
(-1.10) 
-0.386  
(-1.26) 
-0.407  
(-1.26) 
-0.329  
(-1.13) 
Initial private  credit 
(high income) 
     0.547  
(1.19) 
0.418  
(0.93) 
0.317  
(0.70) 
-0.207  
(-0.35) 
-0.412  
(-0.67) 
TOT change (shock)  -32.476*** 
 (-2.70) 
-33.177*** 
 (-2.78) 
-25.210** 
 (-2.07) 
-22.592  
(-1.59) 
 -35.048*** 
 (-2.78) 
-35.299*** 
 (-2.81) 
-26.857** 
 (-2.11) 
-28.117*  
(-1.88) 
Black market 
premium 
  0.001** 
 (2.43) 
0.001 
 (1.63) 
0.001  
(1.57) 
  0.0005*  
(1.92) 
0.0005 
 (1.50) 
0.0005  
(1.26) 
Openness   0.004  
(1.66) 
-0.0000  
(-0.01) 
0.002  
(0.40) 
  0.005 (1.67) 0.000 
 (0.01) 
0.002  
(0.37) 
R-square 0.044 0.360 0.385 0.477 0.555 0.171 0.382 0.403 0.479 0.562 
N 114 79 79 78 78 114 79 79 78 78 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2. 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Private credit = Ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP 
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Table 10: Dependent variable: Business cycle variance for the period 1980-2004  
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Stock market cap   -0.099 
 (-0.82) 
-0.179 
 (-1.34) 
-0.191 
 (-1.37) 
-0.136  
(-0.87) 
-0.133 
 (-0.73) 
     
Stock market cap 
(low income) 
     -0.558*** 
 (-2.73) 
-0.634**  
(-2.37) 
-0.654**  
(-2.30) 
-0.413*  
(-1.94) 
-0.425**  
(-2.13) 
Stock market cap 
(middle income) 
     -0.069  
(-0.52) 
-0.086  
(-0.64) 
-0.090  
(-0.65) 
-0.045  
(-0.27) 
0.015  
(0.07) 
Stock market cap 
(high income) 
     0.209  
(0.89) 
0.136  
(0.52) 
0.104 
 (0.37) 
-0.175  
(-0.78) 
-0.354  
(-1.15) 
TOT change 
(shock) 
 -20.072**  
(-2.19) 
-20.891** 
 (-2.25) 
-11.145  
(-1.07) 
-9.241 
 (-0.75) 
 -29.484*** 
 (-3.24) 
-30.518*** 
 (-3.27) 
-19.784*  
(-1.88) 
-19.489*  
(-1.76) 
Black market 
premium 
  0.0001 
(0.86) 
0.0001 
(0.43) 
0.0001 
(0.49) 
  0.000  
(0.22) 
7.51e-06 
(0.05) 
-0.000  
(-0.16) 
Openness   0.004* 
(1.85) 
0.002  
(0.69) 
0.004 
(1.02) 
  0.004**  
(2.06) 
0.003  
(1.09) 
0.005  
(1.45) 
R-square 0.007 0.334 0.355 0.478 0.562 0.151 0.410 0.433 0.513 0.608 
N 82 58 58 57 57 82 58 58 57 57 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2. 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Stock market cap = Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
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Table 11: Dependent variable: Long-run variance for the period 1980-2004 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Stock market cap   -0.057 
 (-0.52) 
-0.069  
(-0.70) 
-0.087 
 (-0.85) 
-0.015  
(-0.14) 
-0.045  
(-0.38) 
     
Stock market cap 
(low income) 
     -0.198  
(-1.04) 
-0.334  
(-1.22) 
-0.327  
(-1.20) 
-0.097  
(-0.46) 
-0.129  
(-0.56) 
Stock market cap 
(middle income) 
     -0.056  
(-0.44) 
-0.010  
(-0.10) 
-0.029  
(-0.29) 
0.033  
(0.28) 
0.018  
(0.13) 
Stock market cap 
(high income) 
     0.059 
(0.29) 
0.069  
(0.28) 
0.016  
(0.06) 
-0.300*  
(-1.78) 
-0.536*  
(-1.94) 
TOT change 
(shock) 
 -14.720*  
(-1.79) 
-15.563**  
(-1.98) 
-7.604 
 (-0.89) 
-11.101  
(-1.06) 
 -20.351** 
 (-2.32) 
-20.733** 
 (-2.47) 
-11.230  
(-1.28) 
-15.657  
(-1.68) 
Black market 
premium 
  0.0004*** 
(2.82) 
0.0003** 
(2.41) 
0.0004** 
(2.25) 
  0.0004** 
(2.64) 
0.0003** 
(2.50) 
0.0003**  
(2.04) 
Openness   0.001  
(0.69) 
-4.12e-06  
(-0.00) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
  0.001 
 (0.84) 
0.0004  
(0.19) 
0.002  
(0.58) 
R-square 0.003 0.202 0.249 0.489 0.567 0.023 0.248 0.287 0.518 0.614 
N 82 58 58 57 57 82 58 58 57 57 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2. 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Stock market cap = Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
 
 
 
 
 42 
 
 
Table 12: Dependent variable: Total variance for the period 1980-2004 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Stock market cap   -0.136 
 (-0.76) 
-0.240 
 (-1.33) 
-0.262 
 (-1.39) 
-0.168  
(-0.78) 
-0.118 
 (-0.51) 
     
Stock market cap 
(low income) 
     -0.442  
(-1.48) 
-0.448  
(-1.25) 
-0.465  
(-1.25) 
-0.267  
(-0.79) 
-0.158  
(-0.49) 
Stock market cap 
(middle income) 
     -0.060  
(-0.28) 
-0.115  
(-0.52) 
-0.138  
(-0.65) 
-0.099  
(-0.40) 
-0.002  
(-0.01) 
Stock market cap 
(high income) 
     0.326 
(0.83) 
0.063  
(0.20) 
-0.023  
(-0.07) 
-0.613**  
(-2.40) 
-0.469  
(-0.97) 
TOT change 
(shock) 
 -19.798  
(-1.41) 
-21.017  
(-1.48) 
-7.851 
 (-0.47) 
-1.706 
 (-0.08) 
 -44.679  
(-2.79) 
-46.266***  
(-2.79) 
-41.294*  
(-1.86) 
-29.537  
(-1.44) 
Black market 
premium 
  0.0004** 
(2.39) 
0.0003 
(1.52) 
0.0004 
(1.52) 
  0.0004** 
(2.34) 
0.0004** 
(2.06) 
0.0004*  
(1.77) 
Openness   0.003  
(1.10) 
0.001  
(0.17) 
0.003 
(0.51) 
  0.006* 
 (1.68) 
0.007  
(1.26) 
0.008  
(1.22) 
R-square 0.006 0.381 0.398 0.502 0.589 0.063 0.434 0.471 0.543 0.637 
N 82 58 58 57 57 82 58 58 57 57 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2. 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Stock market cap = Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
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Table 13: Dependent variable: Business cycle variance for the period 1980-2004 (Initial stock market capitalization is the explanatory 
variable) 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Init Stock market 
cap   
-0.045 
 (-0.40) 
-0.152 
 (-1.14) 
-0.170 
 (-1.20) 
-0.101 
 (-0.68) 
-0.144 
 (-0.86) 
     
Init Stock market 
cap (low income) 
     -0.339*** 
 (-2.84) 
-0.445*** 
 (-3.26) 
-0.519*** 
 (-3.42) 
-0.323**  
(-2.12) 
-0.358**  
(-2.29) 
Init Stock market 
cap (middle 
income) 
     -0.004  
(-0.03) 
-0.061  
(-0.44) 
-0.063  
(-0.44) 
0.026  
(0.17) 
0.043  
(0.22) 
Init Stock market 
cap (high 
income) 
     0.348** 
(2.00) 
0.113 
 (0.45) 
0.124  
(0.45) 
-0.167  
(-0.79) 
-0.217  
(-0.86) 
TOT change 
(shock) 
 -18.934* 
 (-1.87) 
-19.628*  
(-1.91) 
-6.277 
 (-0.56) 
-8.738 
 (-0.67) 
 -26.141*** 
 (-2.76) 
-27.936*** 
 (-2.93) 
-14.037  
(-1.49) 
-16.279  
(-1.60) 
Black market 
premium 
  0.0001 
(0.61) 
0.0001 
(0.30) 
0.0001 
(0.47) 
  -0.0001  
(-1.06) 
-0.0001  
(-0.77) 
-0.0001  
(-0.80) 
Openness   0.004** 
(2.24) 
0.002 
 (0.87) 
0.005 
(1.31) 
  0.006*** 
(2.90) 
0.004  
(1.50) 
0.006**  
(1.98) 
R-square 0.002 0.345 0.376 0.512 0.607 0.216 0.408 0.455 0.575 0.667 
N 75 52 52 51 51 75 52 52 51 51 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2. 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Stock market cap = Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
 
 
 
 44 
 
 
Table 14: Dependent variable: Long-run variance for the period 1980-2004 (Initial stock market capitalization is the explanatory 
variable) 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Init Stock market 
cap   
-0.025  
(-0.23) 
-0.107 
 (-0.88) 
-0.115 
 (-0.93) 
0.005  
(0.04) 
-0.026 
 (-0.21) 
     
Init Stock market 
cap (low income) 
     -0.131  
(-0.84) 
-0.393*** 
 (-2.74) 
-0.387**  
(-2.49) 
-0.180  
(-1.25) 
-0.214  
(-1.29) 
Init Stock market 
cap (middle 
income) 
     -0.021  
(-0.18) 
-0.016  
(-0.12) 
-0.029  
(-0.22) 
0.129  
(1.32) 
0.159  
(1.37) 
Init Stock market 
cap (high 
income) 
     0.133 
(0.54) 
0.137  
(0.61) 
0.093  
(0.39) 
-0.203  
(-1.22) 
-0.258  
(-1.25) 
TOT change 
(shock) 
 -13.849  
(-1.42) 
-14.848  
(-1.59) 
-2.294 
 (-0.23) 
-6.025  
(-0.55) 
 -20.927** 
 (-2.51) 
-21.386** 
 (-2.61) 
-8.925  
(-1.35) 
-13.231*  
(-1.74) 
Black market 
premium 
  .0004*** 
(2.95) 
0.0003** 
(2.26) 
0.0004** 
(2.34) 
  0.0003** 
(2.03) 
0.0002** 
(1.97) 
0.0001  
(1.07) 
Openness   0.001  
(0.82) 
0.0002 
(0.07) 
0.002 
(0.57) 
  0.002  
(1.40) 
0.001 
 (0.55) 
0.003  
(1.19) 
R-square 0.001 0.213 0.263 0.535 0.600 0.068 0.320 0.350 0.656 0.722 
N 75 52 52 51 51 75 52 52 51 51 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2. 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Stock market cap = Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
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Table 15: Dependent variable: Total variance for the period 1980-2004 (Initial stock market capitalization is the explanatory variable) 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Init Stock market 
cap   
-0.116 
 (-0.63) 
-0.298  
(-1.49) 
-0.317 
 (-1.52) 
-0.189  
(-0.87) 
-0.235 
 (-0.93) 
     
Init Stock market 
cap (low income) 
     -0.262  
(-1.38) 
-0.372  
(-1.57) 
-0.435*  
(-1.69) 
-0.186  
(-0.70) 
-0.199  
(-0.70) 
Init Stock market 
cap (middle 
income) 
     0.086 
(0.48) 
0.016 
 (0.08) 
0.0002  
(0.00) 
0.192  
(0.99) 
0.299  
(1.41) 
Init Stock market 
cap (high 
income) 
     0.592* 
(1.89) 
0.228  
(0.81) 
0.192 
 (0.61) 
-0.327  
(-1.12) 
-0.070  
(-0.17) 
TOT change 
(shock) 
 -20.269  
(-1.34) 
-21.559  
(-1.43) 
-2.229 
 (-0.13) 
-3.583 
 (-0.18) 
 -39.769** 
 (-2.37) 
-41.966** 
 (-2.42) 
-28.490  
(-1.48) 
-22.324  
(-1.04) 
Black market 
premium 
  0.0004**  
(2.55) 
0.0003  
(1.50) 
0.0004 
(1.68) 
  0.0002 
 (0.91) 
0.0001 
 (0.63) 
0.0001  
(0.43) 
Openness   0.004  
(1.46) 
0.001  
(0.28) 
0.005 
(0.79) 
  0.008** 
 (2.04) 
0.007  
(1.10) 
0.009  
(1.41) 
R-square 0.006 0.407 0.427 0.537 0.621 0.152 0.444 0.490 0.637 0.712 
N 75 52 52 51 51 75 52 52 51 51 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (8) and (9) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, and polity2. 
Columns (5) and (10) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, and fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, 
and latitude). 
Columns (6) and (11) control for log of income in 1980, high school enrolment in 1980, polity2, fixed factors (landlocked, tropical and legal origin dummies, and 
latitude), and regional dummies. 
  
Stock market cap = Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP
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Table 16: Panel estimation for the OECD countries for the period 1960-2004  
 
 Dependent variable: Business cycle variance Dependent variable: Long-run variance 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Fixed Effect  Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Random Effect  Random Effect 
Initial private  credit  -0.266**  
(-2.54) 
-0.207**  
(-2.06) 
-0.207*  
(-1.94) 
-0.0493  
(-0.44) 
-0.050  
(-0.39) 
-0.098  
(-0.70) 
TOT change (shock)  0.833  
(0.08) 
0.513  
(0.05) 
 -22.265* 
(-1.95) 
-17.993  
(-1.63) 
Black market premium   0.0002 
(0.22) 
  0.032** 
(2.36) 
Openness   0.002  
(0.40) 
  0.023 
(1.59) 
Hausman test (Prob of Chi-square) 0.296 0.643 0.677 0.998 0.084 0.061 
R-square 0.132 0.492 0.495 0.005 0.057 0.3432 
N 40 36 36 40 36 36 
 
All regressions include a constant. Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity corrected t-values. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively.   
 
Columns (3), (4), (6) and (7) control for log of initial income (1960 and 1980), initial high school enrolment (1960 and 1980), and polity2 
 
Private credit = Ratio of private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP 
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Appendix 
 
A.1 Description of data 
 
Variable name  Source Period  
Real per capita GDP 
(RGDPL) 
Penn World Table 6.2  1960-2004 
Private credit by deposit 
banks and other financial 
institutions / GDP 
Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Ross Levine, 2000 (updated 
Nov. 2008) 
1960-2004 (Initial period 
varies by country) 
Value of stock market 
capitalization / GDP 
Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Ross Levine, 2000 (updated 
Nov. 2008) 
1960-2004 (Initial period 
varies by country) 
Openness (X + M as % of 
GDP) 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
1960-2004 
High school enrolment World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
1960-2004 
Terms of trade  Global Development Network 1960-1999 
Black market premium Global Development Network 1960-1999 
Institution (revised polity-2)  Polity IV Project: 
Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2007 
1960-2004 
Legal origin, landlocked, 
latitude, income group (low, 
middle and high)  
Global Development Network, and 
World Development Indicators, 
World Bank 
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A.2: Variance of different frequency range (Low income countries: World Bank 
classification) for 1980-2004 
 
Country Name 
Total 
variance 
Lon run 
variance 
Business cycle 
variance 
Lon run 
variance share 
Business cycle 
variance share 
Bangladesh 5.47 1.47 2.66 0.27 0.49 
Benin 10.96 1.50 3.42 0.14 0.31 
Bhutan 34.08 5.39 16.00 0.16 0.47 
Burkina Faso 14.82 3.68 7.17 0.25 0.48 
Burundi 50.50 10.99 23.59 0.22 0.47 
Central African 
Republic 37.54 10.93 15.72 0.29 0.42 
Chad 60.12 10.14 33.22 0.17 0.55 
China 7.99 1.86 3.05 0.23 0.38 
Comoros 11.31 4.60 3.76 0.41 0.33 
Dem. Rep. Congo  94.17 26.32 45.82 0.28 0.49 
Ethiopia 91.09 14.19 23.23 0.16 0.25 
Gambia 18.39 5.73 8.18 0.31 0.44 
Guinea 12.64 5.37 4.30 0.42 0.34 
Haiti 34.66 5.10 9.72 0.15 0.28 
Honduras 9.14 0.78 5.57 0.09 0.61 
India 3.80 1.26 1.76 0.33 0.46 
Indonesia 16.18 5.41 7.62 0.33 0.47 
Korea (North) 28.81 19.68 4.25 0.68 0.15 
Laos PDR 33.22 5.06 16.77 0.15 0.50 
Lesotho 33.57 7.66 14.50 0.23 0.43 
Madagascar 15.00 1.80 5.90 0.12 0.39 
Malawi 35.56 7.42 21.41 0.21 0.60 
Mali 34.30 3.52 13.40 0.10 0.39 
Mauritania 20.62 5.08 4.27 0.25 0.21 
Mozambique 62.28 21.81 29.67 0.35 0.48 
Nepal 10.94 1.02 5.24 0.09 0.48 
Nicaragua 21.62 8.71 4.64 0.40 0.21 
Nigeria 27.11 5.04 11.76 0.19 0.43 
Pakistan 3.24 1.56 1.24 0.48 0.38 
Sao Tome and Principe 45.10 16.21 15.02 0.36 0.33 
Senegal 24.16 2.66 12.87 0.11 0.53 
Solomon Islands 50.45 22.28 16.01 0.44 0.32 
Somalia 46.71 8.17 21.80 0.17 0.47 
Sudan 19.17 4.71 11.14 0.25 0.58 
Tanzania 88.43 25.57 36.15 0.29 0.41 
Togo 32.02 7.50 14.40 0.23 0.45 
Uganda 27.80 7.90 13.26 0.28 0.48 
Zambia 32.03 8.74 12.26 0.27 0.38 
Zimbabwe 78.05 19.65 25.75 0.25 0.33 
  
Countries in bold are included in the regressions with all controls 
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A.3: Variance of different frequency range (Middle income countries: World Bank 
classification) for 1980-2004 
 
Country Name 
Total 
variance 
Lon run 
variance 
Business cycle 
variance 
Lon run 
variance share 
Business cycle 
variance share 
Algeria 8.97 2.01 4.78 0.22 0.53 
Barbados 8.99 3.90 3.17 0.43 0.35 
Belize 46.48 14.61 16.98 0.31 0.37 
Botswana 33.77 5.57 15.68 0.16 0.46 
Brazil 12.56 3.15 4.76 0.25 0.38 
Cape Verde 19.93 5.08 4.66 0.25 0.23 
Chile 23.58 10.26 9.16 0.44 0.39 
Colombia 1.91 1.04 0.63 0.54 0.33 
Costa Rica 11.86 4.62 6.12 0.39 0.52 
Cuba 69.55 31.88 23.86 0.46 0.34 
Dominica 40.00 6.90 17.04 0.17 0.43 
Dominican Republic 13.30 5.20 5.81 0.39 0.44 
Egypt 5.33 0.52 2.25 0.10 0.42 
El Salvador 7.79 5.08 2.00 0.65 0.26 
Fiji 41.95 5.81 23.35 0.14 0.56 
Guatemala 3.64 1.88 1.18 0.52 0.32 
Iran 50.08 18.30 22.76 0.37 0.45 
Jamaica 12.05 3.32 5.23 0.28 0.43 
Jordan 37.60 22.32 10.62 0.59 0.28 
Korea (South) 18.55 5.08 8.48 0.27 0.46 
Malaysia 7.17 2.84 3.31 0.40 0.46 
Maldives 31.17 5.15 16.85 0.17 0.54 
Mauritius 10.75 2.90 4.77 0.27 0.44 
Mexico 12.23 3.06 6.55 0.25 0.54 
Micronesia 28.05 6.53 11.06 0.23 0.39 
Morocco 23.40 0.98 4.02 0.04 0.17 
Namibia 25.84 2.33 14.68 0.09 0.57 
Oman 17.33 4.05 7.83 0.23 0.45 
Panama 20.56 5.18 10.42 0.25 0.51 
Papua New Guinea 42.85 8.34 19.18 0.19 0.45 
Peru 40.81 13.73 21.96 0.34 0.54 
Poland 21.13 12.08 7.77 0.57 0.37 
Puerto Rico 9.70 3.50 3.36 0.36 0.35 
Romania 30.33 18.49 9.26 0.61 0.31 
Samoa 31.87 10.08 9.21 0.32 0.29 
Saudi Arabia 50.38 23.08 19.37 0.46 0.38 
South Africa 4.07 1.90 1.58 0.47 0.39 
Sri Lanka 8.59 0.99 4.84 0.11 0.56 
St. Kitts and Nevis 27.27 4.59 11.18 0.17 0.41 
St. Lucia 22.21 9.99 6.97 0.45 0.31 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 31.54 5.06 12.23 0.16 0.39 
Swaziland 10.96 4.28 4.03 0.39 0.37 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 35.66 10.38 13.99 0.29 0.39 
Thailand 15.91 9.04 4.74 0.57 0.30 
 50 
Tonga 80.24 30.58 31.13 0.38 0.39 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 81.26 28.30 32.63 0.35 0.40 
Tunisia 4.55 0.42 1.44 0.09 0.32 
Uruguay 41.81 14.13 21.73 0.34 0.52 
Vanuatu 68.09 14.79 32.62 0.22 0.48 
Venezuela 28.71 3.23 17.47 0.11 0.61 
 
Countries in bold are included in the regressions with all controls 
 
A.4: Variance of different frequency range (High income countries: World Bank 
classification) for 1980-2004 
 
Country Name 
Total 
variance 
Lon run 
variance 
Business cycle 
variance 
Lon run 
variance share 
Business cycle 
variance share 
Australia 2.36 0.63 1.02 0.27 0.43 
Austria 1.36 0.57 0.57 0.42 0.42 
Bermuda 9.73 2.22 3.89 0.23 0.40 
Brunei 34.65 12.49 16.30 0.36 0.47 
Canada 5.29 1.99 2.39 0.38 0.45 
Cyprus 6.92 2.06 2.53 0.30 0.37 
Denmark 3.09 1.13 1.15 0.37 0.37 
Finland 12.19 6.18 4.69 0.51 0.38 
Germany 2.05 0.84 0.94 0.41 0.46 
Greece 5.24 2.83 1.74 0.54 0.33 
Hong Kong 15.24 5.56 7.00 0.36 0.46 
Israel 7.27 1.56 4.08 0.21 0.56 
Italy 1.50 0.62 0.66 0.41 0.44 
Japan 3.49 2.02 1.25 0.58 0.36 
Macao, China 28.52 14.23 9.31 0.50 0.33 
Netherlands 2.80 1.50 1.14 0.54 0.41 
Netherlands Antilles 11.58 5.30 3.79 0.46 0.33 
New Zealand 3.47 1.48 1.08 0.43 0.31 
Norway 2.86 1.27 1.33 0.44 0.46 
Portugal 6.21 3.67 1.98 0.59 0.32 
Qatar 51.87 27.94 15.07 0.54 0.29 
Singapore 20.86 5.04 9.71 0.24 0.47 
Spain 2.60 1.71 0.71 0.66 0.27 
Sweden 4.05 1.93 1.53 0.48 0.38 
Taiwan, China 6.36 3.09 1.85 0.49 0.29 
United Kingdom 3.06 1.55 1.29 0.51 0.42 
United States 3.69 1.19 1.65 0.32 0.45 
 
Countries in bold are included in the regressions with all controls 
 
 
 
